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Abstract
The paper was presented as a keynote lecture at the 10th anniversary of the Amsterdam 
Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) in April 2008. It surveys the trajectory 
of scholarly work on labor after 1945, from its initial emphasis on rights of industrial 
and social citizenship to its present preoccupation with “flexibility” and “flexicurity”. 
It recalls the dissolution of the “Fordist” compromise in the 1970s and the subsequent 
gradual expansion of markets as the dominant mechanism for the allocation of life 
chances and the governance of society. Marketization encountered surprisingly little 
resistance, in real life as in the evolving conceptual apparatus of scholarly work. Lib-
eralization proceeded and continues to proceed regardless of the social dislocations 
it causes, on a scale wholly unimaginable and indeed unacceptable under the postwar 
settlement. The paper ends with speculation on what if at all might be the forces today 
that could trigger a Polanyian counter-movement to the progress of capitalist social and 
economic relations. In particular it discusses whether demographic change, in terms of 
both a declining birth rate and increasing life expectancy, might bring about a new wave 
of market-containing social policy. 
Zusammenfassung
Das Papier wurde auf einer Konferenz im April 2008 anläßlich des 10. Jahrestags der 
Gründung des Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) vorgetragen. 
Es befasst sich mit der Entwicklung der Forschung über Arbeit und Arbeitsbeziehungen 
nach 1945, von ihrer anfänglichen Betonung von industriellen und sozialen Bürger-
rechten zu ihrer gegenwärtigen fast ausschließlichen Beschäftigung mit „Flexibilität“ 
und „Flexicurity“. Erinnert wird an die Auflösung des „fordistischen“ Kompromisses in 
den siebziger Jahren und die anschließende schrittweise Expansion von Märkten als do-
minierenden Mechanismen der Allokation von Lebenschancen und gesellschaftlicher 
Ordnungsbildung. Erstaunlicherweise stieß der Vormarsch des Marktes nur auf gerin-
gen Widerstand, in der Wirklichkeit der Gesellschaft ebenso wie in dem begrifflichen 
Instrumentarium der Forschung über die Arbeitsgesellschaft. Die Liberalisierung der 
politischen Ökonomien der entwickelten Gesellschaften schritt und schreitet fort, un-
geachtet der von ihr ausgehenden sozialen Erschütterungen, in einem Ausmaß, das 
nach den Maßstäben der Nachkriegsordnung unvorstellbar und gänzlich unakzeptabel 
erschienen wäre. Der Vortrag endet mit Spekulationen darüber, welche sozialen Ent-
wicklungen heute eine Polanyische Gegenbewegung zu der in Gang befindlichen ra-
piden Ausweitung kapitalistischer sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen auslösen 
könnten. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt dem demographischen Wandel, in Gestalt so-
wohl einer sinkenden Geburtenrate als auch einer weiter zunehmenden Lebenserwar-
tung, als möglichem Auslöser einer neuen Welle markteindämmender Sozialpolitik.
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Industrial Relations Today: Reining in Flexibility
Ten years of AIAS are a good occasion to reflect on what scholars in industrial relations 
and the sociology of work are doing today, how it compares with what their disciplines 
were doing when they came of age, and how our current concerns relate to the concepts, 
assumptions and objectives out of which they developed. Modern scholarship on labor, 
I will argue, began in earnest after the end of the Second World War, with the “postwar 
settlement” of democratic capitalism and as an important part of it. Jelle Visser and I 
were not yet around then, although we are now both over sixty. But when we were stu-
dents in the late 1960s, the culture of social science into which we were socialized was 
still the one that had emerged after 1945 in an encounter between European Social De-
mocracy and the American New Deal – both of which were to undergo deep transfor-
mations or vanish altogether shortly thereafter in the 1970s. So if there are differences 
between the problems we are studying now and those that were being studied then, we 
should be able to tell. In fact, if we make the effort to look back at the history of our dis-
ciplines, we might be able to say whether the pressure of changing concerns has caused 
us to lose or give up on perspectives along the way that we should have better kept alive 
and that we might want to recover if at all possible.
Of course, nothing is as difficult to discern as gradual change. “War is the father of all 
things,” says Heraclitus, and clearly our habit of using wars to mark the turn of histori-
cal periods makes sense, given the fundamental and easily recognized sort of change 
that wars usually cause. Today Europeans are looking back at 63 years of peace, which 
may be the longest peacetime their countries ever experienced. With so much continu-
ity, change is hard to detect and easy to question, if only because transitions will be long, 
and there are likely to be enough exceptions and qualifications to make any generaliza-
tion look like a simplification. This comes on top of a more general problem that I will 
also have to face: that anyone who suggests that historical development is not necessar-
ily historical progress invites the suspicion that he is, for whatever reason, romanticiz-
ing the past – or simply that he is by temperament a “pessimist.”
I
I will begin my reflections by noting that industrial relations and industrial sociology 
as we know them were the products of a time when the practical problem in Western 
Europe and the United States was reconciling capitalism with democracy. This includ-
ed the institutionalized recognition of both worker collectivism, embodied in strong 
This paper is based on a lecture held at the 10 Year Conference of the Amsterdam Institute for Ad-
vanced Labour Studies (AIAS), Amsterdam, 17 April 2008.
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trade unions, and worker traditionalism, expressed in a desire, widespread after the 
devastations of the war, for social stability and economic security. The social construc-
tion used to make wage labor compatible with the aspirations of a working class that 
had returned from the battlefields both politically powerful and economically demand-
ing was a broad introduction of social and industrial rights, as celebrated at the time 
by the sociologist T.H. Marshall in his famous lectures of 1949 on “Citizenship and 
Social Class” (Marshall 1965 [1949]: 412). Along with many others, Marshall believed 
that only the continuous expansion of rights of citizenship – not just the civil right to 
participate in markets, but also the political right to vote in democratic elections, the 
industrial right to free collective bargaining, and the social right to a decent standard 
of living including secure employment guaranteed by public policy – would reconcile 
the working classes with the inherent inequalities that a capitalist market economy was 
inevitably to produce.
Looking more closely at Marshall’s famous claim that the rights of citizenship form “the 
foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be built” (Marshall 
1965 [1949]: 96), we find that it implied two strong expectations. One was that workers 
would content themselves with life under capitalism if in exchange their representatives 
were co-opted into the command posts of the emerging democratic welfare state. The 
other was that capitalism would be able, and capitalists would be willing, to underwrite 
a continuous increase in citizen entitlements to steady employment, rising wages, a 
relatively egalitarian wage structure, and universal social protection from all sorts of 
risks, “from cradle to grave.” Given the Cold War division of the world and the declin-
ing appeal of the Stalinist-Communist alternative to capitalism, the first condition ulti-
mately turned out to be less of a problem than the second – which required that steady 
economic growth and a high level of employment be provided for by a national and in-
ternational Keynesian economic policy. Later this was to be complemented by selective 
government intervention in the form of a variety of industrial and technology policies 
aimed at maintaining sufficient demand for labor under rising wages, improving work-
ing conditions, and continuously expanding the social security system.
Well into the 1960s not only governments, trade unions and large industrial firms, but 
also mainstream economists were convinced that the feat they had taken upon them-
selves could be done, even though it would require considerable effort and a funda-
mental rebuilding of the machinery of the state, a deep reform of the institutions of 
industrial relations, and a broad expansion of the social sciences. Our disciplines, in 
particular industrial relations and industrial sociology, were believed to play a vital 
role in the management of “modern capitalism.” They had to deal with questions like 
how trade unions should best be organized to be able to push for and gain steadily ex-
panding industrial and social rights and an egalitarian wage structure; what strategies 
would enable unions to take advantage of the many opportunities offered to them by 
corporatist institutions and collective bargaining at national and industrial level; how 
workplaces were to to be organized to offer workers a chance for democratic participa-
tion, as was presumably required for the proper functioning of “industrial society”; how 
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unions should best utilize their traditional connections to Social-Democratic parties 
and governments to involve themselves effectively in demand management and indus-
trial policy; what measures, including reforms in trade union organization and collec-
tive bargaining, could be taken to prevent full employment and free collective bargain-
ing from resulting in rising rates of inflation; how strong trade unions could generally 
be induced to adopt a long-term perspective on the interests of their members, in par-
ticular to exploit the opportunities inherent in political exchange of short-term wage 
interests for long-term political interests in political power and social benefits; and how 
strikes and other industrial disruptions could be avoided by turning the class struggle 
at the workplace into a “democratic class struggle” in the polity, where the interests of 
workers would presumably be better satisfied and capitalism could be better governed 
in the interest of society than at the factory level.
Later, at the time of its slow demise in the 1970s, the political economy in which ques-
tions like these made sense came to be referred to as “Fordism.” Fordism was an attempt 
to combine modernism and traditionalism, capitalism and socialism, the expansion of 
markets and the progress of social rights, under the auspices of large-scale industrial 
technology and mass production. It was a truly historical compromise: workers accept-
ed private property and dependent employment as wage earners and firms had to learn 
to live with a heavily politically regulated employment relationship that respected the 
desire of workers for stability and security, in particular for protection from the vaga-
ries of self-regulating labor markets with free-floating relative prices and permanently 
fluctuating demand for different sorts of labor power. Fordism, in other words, imposed 
strict limits on the commodification of labor, in the name of what was then widely per-
ceived, also by capital, as a public interest in social peace and integration, one that justi-
fied and indeed required all sorts of political intervention in the economy. One illustra-
tion of how the traditionalism of social rights contained the commodification of labor 
was the – later much maligned – principle of a “living wage,” which, given the social 
structure of the time, had to be a “family wage” for the famous, or now infamous, “male 
breadwinner.” Another was the artificial village of the emerging welfare state, which 
came to replace the real village of pre- and early industrial society and whose subsis-
tence economy offered parts of the population a, however modest, alternative to having 
to make a living under the pressures of markets and capital accumulation. Industrial 
relations under Fordism had to teach firms how to live with conditions of employment 
that were largely determined politically and collectively as social rights, regardless of a 
firm’s market situation, while industrial policy had to help firms sustain employment 
relationships that they were prohibited from adjusting to their changing economic con-
ditions. Politicians, in turn, had to learn how to divert part of the economic surplus to 
funding extensive social rights and maintaining a growing refuge outside and around 
the labor market and the factories, for whoever was considered too old, too young, too 
disabled, too much engaged in family work etc. to have to enter the labor market.
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II
Some of us remember, and the younger ones have often been told, how Fordism and 
the Social-Democratic model of society that came to be aligned with it failed when two 
major assumptions upon which they had been built turned out to be illusions: that 
social rights could be extended indefinitely, if gradually, under capitalism, and that the 
capitalist predators of early industrialism would get used to, and indeed addicted to, the 
security offered by state economic management, making them forever eschew free mar-
ket adventures and settle happily into a domesticated existence as stable-fed milking 
cows feeding a social-democratic folkhemmet. In the 1960s, the postwar combination 
of free collective bargaining and a government commitment to full employment was 
already turning out to be inflationary, which was soon recognized as an expression of 
severe underlying distributional conflict. Shortly thereafter, rising demands for “work-
place democracy” and a non-Taylorist organization of work began to question essential 
elements of the Fordist peace formula, in particular the prerogative of management to 
manage. Add to this the growing resistance even in a country like Sweden to economic 
pressures for local mobility, with workers beginning to insist that government indus-
trial policy supply jobs where they and their families lived, rather than forcing them to 
call the moving van if they wanted to remain employed.1 The strike waves of 1968 and 
1969 expressed and further fuelled the increasingly ambitious demands of a new gen-
eration of workers and trade union leaders who, in a “revolution of rising expectations,” 
had become so used to a steady expansion of rights and benefits that they found some 
plausibility in ideas developed by students and intellectuals about a political strategy of 
systemüberwindende Reformen, i.e., gradual but irreversible additions to social rights 
accumulating over time until the capitalist system would somehow give way to some 
sort of syndicalist self-government of an associated working class.
As indicated, this illusion fell apart in the second half of the 1970s at the latest. By then it 
had become clear that state planning, indicative or not, had failed and would continue 
to fail to deliver the high rates of growth required for prolonging Fordist Social De-
mocracy into what was then considered “democratic socialism.” The so-called “oil crisis” 
of 1973 was above all a powerful symbolic reminder to the working class, highly wel-
come to governments and business, that their increasingly self-confident claim to the 
wealth produced by modern capitalism was no longer uncontested. “Liberal corporat-
ism” was an attempt to prolong the life of the nationally embedded political economy 
of the 1970s (Streeck 2006); but it was soon clear that union wage restraint was un-
popular with members and that the pension benefits conceded as a reward for coopera-
1 This was a first sign of the impending triumph of Hayek over Keynes. As early as 1950, Hayek 
had argued that Keynesian demand management would cause structural imbalances since 
workers would not follow market signals and move to where they would find new jobs, due to 
“custom” and “habit” (Hayek 1950: 274). Better than Keynes and other modernizers, Hayek un-
derstood the force of traditionalism in social life, including the economy. Workers preferred to 
remain in their accustomed community even in Social-Democratic Sweden where “active labor 
market policy” picked up all their moving expenses.
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tive unions would be the budget deficits of the not-too-far future. Unions, where they 
were still in the mood of the late 1960s, tried to fight rising unemployment by cutting 
working time at full replacement of pay, also in order to make space in the lives of their 
members for political education and union activism – a project that, in the unfolding 
consumer society of the time, was no more than a dream from the 1920s. When cutting 
weekly hours would not deliver full employment, early retirement was used to cut the 
labor supply at public expense. As a result the clientele of the welfare state grew explo-
sively, and so did the costs to the public purse, to employers, and to the workers who 
were still employed.
It was not only labor, however, which gradually abandoned the Fordist compromise. 
In the early 1980s the Reagan and Thatcher governments felt strong or, for that mat-
ter, desperate enough to undertake a political experiment unprecedented in the post-
war era: to demonstrate to workers and the world at large that high unemployment 
no longer stood in the way of a democratic government being reelected. Their success 
spawned liberalization on a worldwide scale, accompanied as it was intended to be by 
deep industrial restructuring, which was accompanied in turn by further unemploy-
ment. Monetary stability was restored, and firms were increasingly happy to give up 
any hope for a negotiated industrial policy to help them out of stagnation. Instead they 
felt encouraged to turn to international markets. “Globalization” thus began already 
in the 1980s, allowing or, as the case may have been, forcing capitalists to break out 
of their national reserves and proceed to new, much larger hunting grounds, where 
greater risks were compensated, hopefully, by even greater opportunities. New infor-
mation technology developed, or was developed, in time to support the creation, first, 
of a global financial system and, later, of integrated production systems extending over 
several continents if necessary. Shareholder value served as a new “political formula” 
to give legitimacy to pressures for a steep increase in the profitability of firms, and to 
a profound redistribution of income and life chances in favor of capital and its execu-
tives of all sorts. The end of Communism in 1989 was also the end of any remaining 
fear among the ruling classes of the West of an alternative to capitalism, and thus of 
whatever perceived need there might still have been to make domestic concessions to 
workers lest they took sides with the enemy.
There is not nearly enough space here to mention even the most important deep trans-
formations that liberalization – or capitalism “unleashed” (Glyn 2006) – caused in 
the political economies of postwar Europe. In the context of the topic at hand, one of 
the most significant changes was of course the enormous expansion of labor markets, 
which was accompanied by a broad “re-commodification” of labor, in direct contra-
diction of the hopes and expectations of the 1960s and 1970s for work and life being 
increasingly protected from market pressures. One factor in this was the disappearance 
of the “family wage” of the 1960s, both reflecting and, very likely, contributing to rising 
labor market participation of women and to what might be called “re-structuring” of 
the traditional family. Later, erosion of the fiscal basis of the welfare state put an end to 
publicly funded retirement of labor and forced a universal turnaround in labor market 
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policy, which now aims everywhere at an increase in participation rates, in part by end-
ing public subsidies to the artificial villages of the welfare state’s modern subsistence 
economy. Re-commodification is also at the heart of the redefinition of social policy as 
an instrument not for taking people out of the market, but for enabling them to survive 
in it, make them “employable” and thereby available for “activation.” 
In more general terms, what liberalization has done for the labor markets of advanced 
capitalist countries, for all practical purposes, is to make their labor supply unlimited. 
This is not just because of the elimination of the internal subsistence economy of the 
family and the recasting of the traditional welfare state, both of which in effect amount 
to yet another wave of expulsion from the “land” (Luxemburg 1913). There are also 
immigration and the enormous geographical expansion of Western labor markets to 
places as far away as China, due to improved communications vastly facilitating foreign 
direct investment and international trade. Unlike the old working classes of the West, 
most of the newcomers to wage labor are enthusiastic about what they experience as 
the liberating effects of markets, including markets for labor. Clearly this applies to 
women after their exit from the Fordist family who, although mostly having to work 
for much less than the former male “breadwinners,” still abstain from joining unions 
in significant numbers. Just as immigrants or workers in China, they thus in effect help 
employers depress wages, on the probably justified assumption that for the huge num-
bers of new entrants in labor Western markets, wherever they are located, inclusion on 
the conditions of the postwar labor regime would be entirely unrealistic. 
The new run on markets for labor has confronted trade unions with what might well 
turn out to be unsolvable organizational problems. In the face of an unlimited labor 
supply, unions can no longer hope to organize an industry’s entire labor force, as they 
would have to in order to eliminate competition and defend, let alone improve, the 
wages and conditions of workers. Moreover, where they successfully resist attempts to 
dismantle their achievements of the past, they run the risk of being accused of protect-
ing the privileges of what are now considered to be established “insiders,” at the expense 
of the legitimate aspirations of a growing mass of “outsiders” who want and need to 
get into waged employment. As a consequence unions find themselves losing not just 
economic power, but also moral credibility, as they refuse to give up the privileges of 
their members to ease the suffering of those who can get work only if they are allowed 
to sell themselves for less. With unions apparently defending the special interests of an 
overpaid labor aristocracy, “free” markets increasingly seem to be the last hope precisely 
for the weakest members of industrial society.
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III
Looking back it is nothing short of astonishing to see how fast the study of labor and 
labor markets re-oriented itself in the 1980s and 1990s in response to the renewed dy-
namism of the capitalist economy. If the leading concern in the past was how to make 
the economy adjust to a steady expansion of social rights, now it became almost a mat-
ter of course how to adapt working conditions and workers to the evolving needs of 
capitalist enterprise. Social rights, once thought to be antecedent to economic interests, 
are hardly mentioned, and instead of de-commodification of labor we now talk about 
how best to re-commodify it, by adding to its “employability” or, if necessary, subject it 
to measures of “activation.” Only rarely does anyone remember the objective that was 
almost universally accepted in the 1960s and 1970s: shielding workers and their fami-
lies from the unpredictability of markets and the fundamentally insatiable demands of 
employers operating under the pressure of competition and striving to maximize the 
return on their capital. Instead we worry about how to get workers and the societies in 
which they live to give employers what they say they need: the necessary “flexibility” to 
adjust employment and working conditions to the changing situations in expanding 
and ever more competitive markets.
How deeply our disciplines have changed in the course of liberalization is revealed by a 
short inspection of some of their core concepts. Industrial relations, which used to be 
about the collective and political determination of industrial rights that firms had to 
honor in return for the privilege of being allowed to hire labor, has given way to “hu-
man resource management,” i.e., the essentially unilateral disposition by employers over 
labor as a “factor of production.” Instead of collectively achieved and politically guaran-
teed social rights, workers are urged to rely on and invest continuously in their “human 
capital,” i.e., their individual productive capacity as valued by current demand in the 
labor market. Rather than waiting for and insisting on secure employment at steady, 
and indeed steadily rising, wages, the flexible worker of today, and even more so of the 
future, is expected economically, politically and even culturally to become what in the 
German language is called an Arbeits kraft unternehmer – a “labor power entrepreneur.” 
That is, he is to learn to consider his labor power, i.e., himself, to be in permanent need 
of being updated through steady if risky investment. He also must be willing to change 
his professional identity as “the market” requires (and indeed would be better off not 
acquiring one in the first place); move to where the jobs are, rather than insisting on the 
jobs moving to him and his family; accept working in “projects” that dissolve when the 
job is done, rather than in the permanent organization of a settled traditional firm; pre-
fer self-employment over dependent employment and be comfortable with the many 
forms in between the two etc. Precarious employment is to be taken to be normal; times 
of unemployment are to be used to acquire new and better skills, at one’s own cost; 
competition for jobs is to be seen as an incentive for self-improvement; and a “share 
economy” in which workers carry some of the risks incurred by their employer is to be 
welcomed as an opportunity for earning bonuses in good times.
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The latest product of the new language of social and labor market policy is a compound 
euphemism that seems to have originated in the Netherlands, “flexicurity.” Almost ev-
erybody defines it differently, which explains the practice at national and international 
meetings on labor market policy of starting with a debate on what flexicurity “really 
is.” That this is not easy to say seems due to the fact that, like many other products of 
“policy-speak,” it does not signify a reality as much as it does a hope – in this case, that 
demands that seemed incompatible in the past may somehow become, or be made 
to appear, compatible. Placed in historical context, the “flexibility” part of “flexicurity” 
carries the message that employment will henceforth be available only on the terms of 
a highly volatile labor market. “Security,” then, the second element of the new concept, 
promises that nevertheless some sort of stability may be possible, although one that is 
quite different from what it used to be. The “fantasy” in the concept, to use language 
from the stock exchange, is one of less security for workers in their present job com-
pensated by more secure expectations of a new job; of less steady employment and 
more frequent unemployment balanced by greater ease of re-employment; of a policy 
abolishing old-fashioned, “rigid” job security while improving modern and “flexible” 
employment security through better employment services and more frequent training 
and retraining; and of a social policy that creates effective incentives for workers to 
keep up-to-date and on their toes, enabling them, as well as giving them no choice but 
to follow the twists and turns of the market and thereby contribute to steady economic 
adjustment and social progress.
I will abstain from speculation about how it can be that some of the founding ideas 
of the study of labor were so effectively expunged under the impression of the period 
change of the 1980s. The reason need not be opportunism alone. For scholarly disci-
plines with applied interests, it may not seem to make much sense, and indeed may be 
a little embarrassing, to keep concepts and ideas alive that seem to have become entirely 
“unrealistic” and “out of date.” What should also have helped was that like liberalization 
itself, conceptual adjustment had time to occur gradually and imperceptibly. No radi-
cal renunciation was required. If scholars did not want to be left behind, all they had 
to do was retrospectively redefine collective bargaining and social policy in economic-
functionalist terms, i.e., as conditions of efficient economic performance, like “security” 
when combined with “flexibility” under the auspices of “flexicurity.” 
Conversion to functionalism did not require wholesale adoption of neo-liberalism, and 
was therefore much more palatable to scholars coming from a nonliberal disciplinary 
tradition. In fact today functionalism seems to have become the dominant rhetoric 
of opposition to neo-liberalism. Its main advantage compared to a language of rights 
is that it is much more difficult to dismiss, even and precisely with reference to the 
competitive pressures associated with “globalization.” Moreover, functionalist reason-
ing is used by the so-called New Institutional Economics as well, which is close to the 
economic mainstream in that it specializes in inventing “adaptive stories” about the 
economic benefits of originally market-constraining institutions. This seems to make 
it tempting for opponents of the neo-capitalist hegemony to use functionalist language 
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like a secret code by which to register their protest against liberal orthodoxy without 
having to fear being accused of economic ignorance by the powers of the day. Neverthe-
less, I submit that by getting used to defending the social regulation of labor markets 
on functionalist grounds one runs the risk of forgetting how to defend it in the name 
of social stability and social justice, not as an economic convenience but as a right, and 
of implying that interventions in the “free play of market forces” that do not happen to 
serve efficiency – meaning, in other words, that “in reality” they cannot demonstrably 
be shown to aid rather than impede capital accumulation – are not worth continuing.
Exactly this, incidentally, I see happening in the tendency, remarkably widespread in 
political science and political economy today, to reinterpret the postwar history of the 
welfare state and of industrial relations as one of far-sighted employers and prudent 
government officials introducing social insurance of all sorts on their own, as instru-
ments for enhancing productivity and competitiveness under the auspices of a coun-
try’s respective “variety of capitalism.” In functionalist “backward induction” of this 
sort, technocratic social engineering replaces social conflict and political mobilization 
as the driving force behind social progress, and capital accumulation, rather than hav-
ing to be made compatible with the public interest by political regulation, is identified 
with it. In the end, a functionalist defense of the welfare state may do nothing more than 
deliver legitimacy for a monistic, economistic concept of a good society, and with it for 
the rationalization of social life in the service of economic efficiency.
IV
The second surprise, which may in part explain the first, was how little resistance was 
mustered against the new wave of commodification by those most affected by it. Con-
sidering the extent of the change from the postwar regime of industrial and social citi-
zenship to the re-commodification of labor under the dictates of free markets, the few 
strikes that took place in the 1980s seem negligible. After they were over, strikes went 
out of fashion entirely, for almost two decades. The “reforms” this made possible passed 
without much opposition, although they were far more than a technical matter. In fact, 
the new keywords of industrial relations and social policy, “flexibility” and “activation,” 
denote a departure not just from specific instruments of labor market regulation, but 
from an entire way of life as embodied, in a stylized manner, in the social character of 
the “risk-averse” worker featured by modern labor economics. The new round of lib-
eralization at the end of the twentieth century entailed a gigantic program of cultural 
and moral re-education, and indeed one that must appear astonishingly successful seen 
from the perspective of the 1970s. In an important sense, it amounted to a frontal at-
tack on the last vestiges of traditionalism, and thus to another step in the long-drawn 
secular process of modernization. Individuals would now have to learn to live with 
much greater uncertainty, and to expect less collective protection from the volatility of 
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the market and for relief from personal responsibility for how they might fare in the 
grand lottery of freely fluctuating relative prices. Included was a broad de-legitimation 
of postwar notions of social entitlement to a settled way of life, and indeed a redefini-
tion of entitlements from an element of citizenship to an impediment to the effective 
operation of markets and the incentives for individual achievement. A telling example 
in Germany was the de-legitimation of the notion of Zumutbarkeit, which used to limit 
the extent to which individuals could be expected by the social security system to lower 
their expectations to what the market was offering them. While in the past only very 
little was zumutbar when it came to taking a lower-paid job or one far away from where 
one lived, today almost everything is if it results in some sort of employment at all, 
however casual and low paid.
Clearly institutional change of such import would have been impossible to accomplish 
had it not met with at least some support in a changing culture. One indication is how 
different public discourse is today from what it was in the 1970s. Suspicion seems more 
widespread than ever that collective solidarity and egalitarian provision benefit mainly 
those unwilling to contribute their share and looking for opportunities to take a free 
ride on the efforts of others. Union membership has been declining for more than two 
decades in most countries, in particular among the growing numbers of those who 
consider themselves high achievers or want to be seen as such. More than ever, union-
ized workers run the risk of being regarded as shirkers, not just by labor economists. 
Also, while this is difficult to measure, it seems that the fact that people were not just 
resigning themselves to the inevitable, but were broadly embracing capitalism as a way 
of life, and markets as sites of opportunity rather than uncertainty, has contributed to 
the ease with which the postwar system has been dismantled. As noted, the number 
of those who consider entry into what was once called “dependent employment” as a 
personal liberation seems substantial, even in old industrial countries. The euthanasia 
of the housewife, which took the place of the euthanasia of the rentier that Keynes had 
hoped for in the final chapter of the General Theory, testifies not only to the economic 
pressures on households in the 1970s, but also to the rise of a new work ethic under 
which being without paid employment carries a severe social stigma, for women as well 
as men.2 Moreover, market prices for labor became increasingly popular as rising num-
bers of immigrants became politically and economically impossible to sustain on social 
assistance when employment at a politically fixed minimum wage could not be found 
for them. Add to this a new complexity in the social structure that has turned workers, 
as contributors to private retirement funds, into beneficiaries of the same shareholder 
value that is undermining the stability of their employment and forcing them to adjust 
more and more quickly to increasingly rapid industrial change. Note also that workers 
2 In Germany the growing popularity of wage labor is reflected today in the widespread use of the 
phrase Nachfrage nach Arbeitsplätzen (demand for jobs), which has almost entirely replaced the 
traditional notion of Arbeitsangebote (labor supply). Even if the secular increase in the supply 
of labor may originally have been due to economic pressures, today “dependent” employment 
seems to be widely sought for its own sake, as access to and certification of bona fide member-
ship in the social community. 
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as consumers may well have become the foremost drivers of product innovation, im-
posing on firms and industries an unprecedented rate of “creative destruction” and en-
abling employers to enlist them as consumers as allies in pressuring them as producers 
to work harder in flexible compliance with changing market signals.
The question is how long the drive of the past two decades for ever more social and per-
sonal flexibility to match the demands of expanding markets can continue. According 
to Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 1957 [1944]), who is cited more often today than ever, there are 
inherent limits to the commodification of labor – one of three “fictitious” commodities 
– that reside in basic human needs for stable social integration in settled communities. 
Still, the cultural revolution of the recent past that has accompanied economic liberal-
ization has adjusted lifestyles to markets in ways that Polanyi would never have thought 
possible. Social bonds, including family relations, have become almost as flexible as em-
ployment. Lifetime families are declining in numbers as fast as lifetime jobs, and rapid 
adjustment of personal lives to changing market opportunities has become a dominant 
element of the general culture, not only in a behavioral but also in a normative sense, 
and indeed at both ends of the labor market. At the lower end, a new “precariat” is lead-
ing insecure and unhappy lives under the unpredictably changing dictates of declining 
and volatile markets for low skills and of shrinking budgets for social assistance. While 
submission to Polanyi’s “satanic mill” is forced on the losers of the neo-liberal revolu-
tion by economic necessity, the new “working couples” of a broad new middle class, 
enthusiastic about having successfully marketed their “human capital,” are voluntarily 
living hundreds of kilometers apart to pursue their “dual careers”; their children, if 
there are any, are sent eight hours a day, five days a week to a crèche; and as a family they 
live on a time regime as strict as that of a monastery or a Fordist factory, with every joint 
activity scheduled by the minute weeks in advance. A growing number of people strive 
to conform to a pervasive and deeply internalized ethos of achievement, embedded 
in turn in a consumerist culture defined by omnipresent images of auratic consumer 
goods standing for individual success. Organizing and re-organizing one’s private life 
in line with what markets and careers dictate is taken as a challenge, an opportunity 
and an adventure to be faced in good spirits, rather than as an unacceptable intrusion 
or, like in the case of the precariat, as an unpleasant necessity. Tellingly, no other sector 
seems to have grown as fast in recent decades as the sports and fitness industries, with 
their rich symbolism of aestheticized effort and competitive achievement.3 In fact if 
anything that was popular in the 1970s was forgotten in subsequent decades, then it was 
the cultural rejection of Leistungsgesellschaft and Konsumterror with which the hippie 
movement of the 1960s began. 
Again, how far can the flexible reorganization of the lifeworld go? For Polanyi, subject-
ing social life to the oscillations of self-regulating markets was nothing more than a 
“frivolous experiment” that was ultimately bound to fail because it would inevitably 
3 Consider the new global phenomenon, to be observed in all large cities, of the mass marathon, 
the Reichsparteitage of an individualized Leistungsgesellschaft.
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give rise to a reconstructive social “countermovement.” While capitalism would by its 
very nature permanently undermine social order, society could be counted on to fight 
back to protect itself – to defend stable expectations, reliable social relations, and last-
ing moral commitments not dependent on market value.4 But is this still true? One 
hesitates to even try an answer, given the extent to which social life has become so much 
more market-compatible, market-driven and market-friendly in such a short a time. 
People today seem to be willing, or at least able, to live with a lot more uncertainty and 
a lot less social stability than would have seemed possible only a few decades ago, and 
the desire for a life protected from market pressures by collectively and politically guar-
anteed rights does not seem to be strong. In fact, hardly anyone seems to place much 
confidence in the prospect of a restoration of collectivism and traditionalism, above the 
nation-state, beyond the postwar family, and inside the “knowledge society.” If people 
have confidence in anything, it seems to be their individual capacity and good luck in 
meeting the changing demands of changing markets. Where there is a desire for more 
security, it seems most of all to benefit the market for private insurance, rather than the 
politics of public solidarity, with the “good risks” looking for risk pools that are as small 
as possible where they will not be forced to pay for those considered “bad risks.” 
V
What could be a politically viable argument for a revival of a discourse on social rights 
that cannot be discredited offhand as a defense of unproductive rent-seeking? An in-
fluential figure of thought in the history of the labor movement was that the political 
mobilization of the working class, if it is to be ultimately successful, must solve prob-
lems not just for workers, but also for capitalists and for society as a whole (Rogers/
Streeck 1994). Thus in the Fordist-Keynesian world, collective agreements that made 
for rising and sticky wages, and a social policy that protected the income of workers and 
their families in economic downturns, expanded and stabilized aggregate demand and 
thereby provided for business opportunity and economic growth. The underlying logic 
– of working class political intervention imposing on capital a regime that it would 
have been unable to create on its own although it would serve its interests as well – was 
explored for the first time in the famous chapter on the “Working Day” in Volume One 
of Marx’ “Capital” (Marx 1990 [1867]: 340–416). Knowing as little as we do about the 
prospects of reform today, we might just as well inform our speculations by referring 
back to what is undoubtedly one of the main sources of modern political thought.
4 The idea, of course, was the same as Marshall’s, who believed that a capitalist market economy 
would be sustainable only in a context of political, industrial and social rights not derived from 
and not reducible to the strategic imperatives of profit maximization.
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As is well known, in the chapter Marx discusses the reasons for the success of the British 
labor movement’s reformist demand for a legal limit on working time. Marx suggests 
that at the time the Factory Act was passed, the exploitation of labor had reached a point 
where the physical existence of the working class, its “reproduction,” was at stake. Capi-
talists themselves, Marx showed, were destroying their most important resource, labor 
power. Under the pressure of competition, however, individual capitalists were unable 
to act on their collective, long-term interest in a sustainable use of labor,5 just as indi-
vidual workers could not resist the demand of their employers for longer hours, even 
though submitting to it was likely to destroy their lives (Marx 1990 [1867]: 412). Child 
labor in particular was decimating the working class as growing numbers of children 
were “used” to the point of exhaustion in the factories of Victorian England, where they 
had no prospect of ever becoming functional adults. In short, using Polanyian language, 
what Marx described was how the commodification of labor threatened the survival 
not only of workers, but of the capitalist system and of society as a whole. In more mod-
ern terms, Marx had, perhaps for the first time in what is now called institutional eco-
nomics, identified a case of fundamental “market failure,” where the aggregate result of 
acting in line with market signals runs counter to the interests even of those who benefit 
from it – and who cannot unilaterally give up their ultimately self-destructive behavior. 
According to Marx, this was why even in nineteenth-century England the demand of 
organized labor for a limitation of working hours became politically irresistible.
It is important not to mistake Marx’s argument as being functionalist in the same sense 
as fashionable economistic theories of the welfare state. Marx does not say that a legal 
entitlement for workers to a life outside of factory and labor market increased produc-
tivity or profitability, and was therefore in the interest of capital. For him a legal limita-
tion of working hours, and thereby of the rate of exploitation, was “functional,” if the 
word is at all appropriate here, first and foremost for humanity and society, in that it 
made their continued existence possible. Only in the second place did it also serve capi-
tal by safeguarding an essential precondition not just of markets and capitalism, but of 
any economy, which is a viable society. Regulation of the working day, in other words, 
was about conservation and subsistence, not about expansion and profit; it protected 
the basic human entitlement to a livable community from subsumption under the logic 
of markets and capital accumulation. That it also enabled markets and capital accumu-
lation to continue to function was only a side effect.
Worker demands for a legal limit on working time, in other words, offered an opportu-
nity for capitalists to resolve otherwise unsolvable problems concerning the sustainabil-
ity of the economic order in which their interests had come to be vested. Can a compa-
rable problem be found today that could provide a basis for a social countermovement 
against flexibility and for the protection of social structures that capitalist firms and 
markets cannot protect although they need them? A possible candidate that comes to 
5 “It would seem therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal 
working day” (Marx 1990 [1867]: 377). 
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mind might be the demographic crisis of advanced capitalist countries – their low birth 
rate and the rising numbers of older people in a shrinking population – which might be 
seen as a contemporary equivalent of the nineteenth-century crisis of the reproduction 
of a sufficiently large working class. Consider the following problem descriptions:
(1) While in nineteenth-century England children died before growing up, today many 
of them are not born to begin with. Declining numbers of children mean shrinking 
product markets and a shrinking supply of labor. Increasing the birth rate will, however, 
require a regime of family-friendly social rights: more stable employment prospects for 
young people, more part-time work, shorter hours, a right to return to a job after a leave 
of absence for family reasons etc. For this to become reality on a sufficiently broad scale, 
more employers must participate than the small number who can afford the short-term 
costs of the necessary changes in their personnel policies, or who stand to benefit from 
them immediately as they are competing for highly-skilled workers. A good way to take 
family-friendly human resource practices out of competition might be to make them 
compulsory by legal regulation.
(2) A growing share of older people in the population will mean that the age of retire-
ment, everything else remaining equal, will have to rise. This will require, among other 
things, more investment in continuous skill development, or life-long learning. Even 
more than that, it will presuppose more sustainable ways of using labor power during 
the entire life-course. A work regime that has individuals burnt out at the age of fifty is 
incompatible with higher labor force participation among people over 65. The older the 
workforce gets, therefore, the more likely it is that the ideas of the 1970s about improv-
ing the “quality of work” and a “humanization of working life” by political-legal means, 
which were stymied by the neo-liberal turn, might be discovered anew. Here, too, regu-
latory and other forms of public intervention may be inevitable if the objective is to 
be attained, given the strong incentives for firms under competition to act collectively 
irresponsibly and against their own long-term interests. 
How realistic is it that the demographic problems of contemporary capitalist societ-
ies, like those of the nineteenth century, might give rise to a new countermovement 
against commodification, bringing about a departure from the present discourse of 
flexibility and a return to a discourse of rights? I am afraid that the answer is far from 
clear. Nobody knew better than Marx that political mobilization required, and indeed 
was largely identical with, a mobilization of aspirations – a collective raising of revo-
lutionary or reformist consciousness, or a “moralization” ending the de-moralization 
that befalls any conquered social group.6 Today even more than in the past, that enough 
people see themselves as victims of the market can only be the result of a process of 
education through, in the language of Marx, effective public “agitation” overcoming the 
passions of success and consumption. Institutional change, that is to say, would have to 
6 For example, an important part of reformist politics in the nineteenth century was convincing 
parents that it was not right to send eight-year old children to work in the factories.
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be preceded by cultural change, which would have to be accomplished against the grain 
of competition and in spite of the attractions of competitive consumerism. It is hard to 
see how a political movement, any political movement, could prevail against forces as 
strong and entrenched as these.
Secondly, on the other side of the bargain – that of employers – the question would be 
whether the manifold possibilities capitalist firms have in a global economy to exit from 
the old capitalist countries have not fundamentally invalidated the Marxian idea of col-
lective long-term interests for whose attainment capitalists must be willing to pay the 
price of political defeat. Today, if workers in the core countries of capitalism became too 
demanding, or too few, or too old, capitalists can in principle externalize the problem 
by packing up and moving in with a new, better working class.7 As pointed out above, 
the supply of workers in a global economy, unlike England of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, is basically unlimited. This is not to say that there can be no shortages in special-
ized segments of the labor market, and in fact there is no doubt that certain groups of 
highly trained workers in old industrial countries are not at all easy to replace, and may 
continue not to be for some time. In this case firms clearly do not have the opportunity 
to escape, and may to the contrary have to accede to whatever demands workers may 
raise concerning their wages and conditions, including fringe benefits such as family 
leave. The point is, however, that where there is economic dependence of this sort, pri-
vate contractual arrangements will fully do the job of keeping workers happy, provided 
the total package does not become more expensive than a competing package with dif-
ferent workers elsewhere. Public intervention will not be required, and collective prob-
lems will not need to be addressed for individual problems to be resolved. Nor is it 
evident where collective action should come from, given that the special deals workers 
with scarce “human capital” will be able to get will buy out those whose strong bargain-
ing position would be needed to lend power the demands of others unable to fend for 
themselves and dependent on collective action and public provision.
VI
My conclusion can be brief. Half a century ago it was the mission of research on in-
dustrial relations and the world of work to teach capitalism how to respect a growing 
sphere of social rights and flourish nevertheless, as a condition of social stability and 
political support for democracy. In the 1980s the Fordist compromise fell apart, and the 
7 Paraphrasing a famous poem by Bertolt Brecht, they could announce to their workers that they 
“had thrown away the confidence” of their employers and “could win it back only / By redoubled 
efforts.” But while it was obviously unrealistic for the East German government after the worker 
uprising in 1953 to follow Brecht’s subversive advice and consider whether it would “not be 
easier … to dissolve the people / And elect another?,” capitalists today can do and are doing 
exactly this.
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balance of power on which it rested shifted away from workers and their organizations. 
Subsequently the protective institutions that had grown along with the postwar econ-
omy came to be seen as impediments to the creation of wealth, and to social progress 
in general. Pressures increased to adapt social life to the demands of ever more volatile 
markets, rather than the other way around. As social rights turned out to be too sticky 
and insufficiently flexible for increasingly competitive markets, the idea that they had 
not originally been created to be efficient tended to be forgotten. Along with economic 
change, cultural values and ways of life changed as well to accommodate unprecedented 
levels of uncertainty and a broad re-engineering of postwar institutions in the spirit of 
economic efficiency. 
While there are still reasons to believe that no society can exist under the dictates of 
self-regulating markets, nobody knows for certain today where the cultural aspirations 
and the political power are to come from that will have to be mobilized if social life is 
to be effectively protected from further commodification. Perhaps the changing demo-
graphic structures of old industrial societies provide an Archimedean point from which 
to reorganize industrial relations and social policy, away from the dictates of efficiency 
and back to a politics of rights. In any case, our disciplines do well to keep their con-
ceptual tools in good enough repair so that they can recognize a countermovement to 
commodification and rational-egoistic utility-maximization when they see one. There 
is a lot of work to be done for all of us, at AIAS and elsewhere.
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